Most "China Watchers" Probably Don't Understand China Well
Truex: In this moment of U.S.-China competition, we must do more than invest in weapons and semiconductors. We must invest in understanding.
The U.S. House of Representatives initiated a “China Week”, during which lawmakers are advancing a series of bills aimed at countering China’s influence. This include the consideration of approximately 25 bills, which have been described as hawkish and primarily focused on national security concerns related to China1.
If passed, these bills “will cause serious interference to China-US relations and mutually beneficial cooperation, and will inevitably damage the United States’ own interests, image and credibility,” Liu Pengyu, spokesman of Chinese Embassy in Washington.
As tensions between the United States and China continue to escalate, a critical question arises that threatens to undermine the effective policymaking and diplomatic engagement of the two powers - the decline of China expertise in the United States. This trend is observed by scholars and policymakers from both countries raises critical questions on the future of the U.S.-China relations.
Recent analyses from Chinese, American and international observers paint a worrying picture on the state of China Studies in the United States234.
Key aspects of this decline include:
Declining language skills: Rory Truex, writing in the Washington Post, notes the enrolments in college level Mandarin courses peaked around 2016 and then fell by more than 20% by 2020. This decline limits the ability of future experts to engage deeply with Chinese sources and culture.
Reduced In-Country Experience: The number of American students studying abroad in china plummeted from 14,887 in 2011-12 to 382 in 2020-21. While this can be partially attributed to the COVID-19 restrictions, the trend predates the pandemic and has been sluggish in recovery.
Shifting Academic Demographics: Truex observes that in the field of Chinese politics, it is rare to see Americans in PhD programmes. The most promising scholars are Chinese citizens, which, although benefits research quality, raises concerns on the depth of American understanding of China.
Ideological Constraints: Li Haidong, writing for Global Times, argues that think tanks and experts in the U.S. are “constrained by the consensus of ‘strategic competition’ and confrontation with China. This makes it difficult to put forth new ideas that challenges hard-line policy.”
Generational Shift: Both Li and Zhou Deyu in an opinion piece for Guancha, noted a significant difference between the current China experts and their predecessors.
Political Climate: The current political climate in the U.S. has made engagement with China increasingly difficult. Zhou points out that “having contact with China” has become a negative label in the U.S. with possibilities of scrutiny or even arrest.
Roots of the Crisis
The deterioration of the U.S.-China relations has created a hostile environment for China studies. Truex notes that “Any American scholar with a research agenda that touches China risks coming under investigation by the U.S. government or being chastised by our officials on social media for aiding China’s rise.” At the same time, Wall Street Journal lamented the difficulties for American studying in China, with a largely blaming the hostility of China for hindering research5. There is a sense of anxiety between the lines: the more the U.S. faces the threats of China, the fewer the people who understand China there are?
U.S. government funding cuts for foreign language and area studies is another factor contributing to the decline. Truex reports that Title IV funding (Higher Education Act of 1965), a primary source for these programmes was cut from $110.3 million in fiscal year 2010 to $68.3 million by fiscal year 2011m with little recovery since. For 2022, the total amount funding was approximately $71.9 million of which 15% goes to East Asia-related programming. Measures like the proposed “Combating Chinese Propaganda Act” aim to limit federal funding to universities hosting Chinese government-funded cultural institutes or programs, could jeopardise legitimate academic exchanges.6 This may create a “new form of McCarthyism” where researchers with any China connection are presumed guilty of espionage.
Furthermore, key programmes that historically produced Chinese experts such as the Fullbright and Peace Corp programmes were discontinued by the Trump administration. Confucius Institutes which provided Chinese language education on many U.S. campuses have largely been closed due to concerns over their ties to China. The special report “Searching for Kissinger” reflects the current state of U.S.-China relations and the challenges facing scholars and policymakers amidst rising tensions. Are there any contemporary figures in the U.S. that matches Henry Kissinger’s influence and understanding of China? Both Zhou and Li reference a “golden age” of China scholarship in the US, exemplified by figures like John King Fairbank, A. Doak Barnett, Ezra Vogel, and David M. Lampton. These scholars, active from the 1940s to the 1990s, were characterised by their deep understanding of Chinese history and culture, and their consistent advocacy for engagement and cooperation with China. But the larger question that looms is whether there is still any interest or need among Americans to genuinely understand China? Is Kissinger a historical exception, and not a model for future engagement? And for China, was there ever a “China expert”? Was there ever a need for one?
The State Department’s Level 3 travel advisory for China has significant ramifications for academic exchange and understanding U.S.-China relations. Reports indicate a drastic drop in American students studying in China and this could exacerbate the lack of understanding of Chinese society, politics, and culture at a time when such knowledge is important. Without firsthand experience, and engagement, misconceptions may proliferate. For example, a Wall Street Journal article highlighted a specific case of an American scholar who was denied entry into China while researching Xinjiang issues. This has become a focal point of international scrutiny due to allegations of human rights issues. but she was not allowed to enter the country by the Chinese government. While there are indeed respected scholars in the field, many argue that contemporary research (of new generation of scholars) often lacks depth or fails to capture the complexities of Chinese society and politics. This generational divide raises concerns about the future quality of China studies in the U.S. That said, the reliance on American leftovers or dependence on Western scholarship may lead to skewed understanding of international dynamics and perpetuate a cycle where superficial understanding prevail.
That said, China’s own stringent “zero-COVID” policy had severely limited foreign access for over two years. Additional security laws (including the Counter-Espionage Law and the Foreign Relations Law) have also been implemented and engaged in actions that created a perception of hostility towards foreigners. For foreign scholars, these laws raise the risks of inadvertently accessing or sharing information that could be deemed sensitive by Chinese authorities.
The decline of China expertise in the United States represents a significant challenge for US-China relations and global stability. As the world’s two largest economies continue to navigate a complex and often contentious relationship, the need for well-informed analysis has never been greater. This necessitates a willingness to engage with perspectives that may challenge prevailing narratives about China. As Truex aptly puts it,
“In this moment of U.S.-China competition, we must do more than invest in weapons and semiconductors. We must invest in understanding.”
Food for Thought
Should the U.S. education system be reformed for deeper and culturally informed China experts while addressing legitimate national security concerns?
What lessons can be learned from the earlier generation of China scholars, and how can these be applied in the current geopolitical context?
How can policymakers balance the need for China expertise with concerns about foreign influence in academic institutions?
How can complex, but holistic views on China stand up to simpler but polarising narratives?
How might increased collaboration between American and Chinese scholars in non-sensitive fields contribute to better mutual understanding and more effective diplomacy?
This article is largely based on Guancha, Global Times, and Washington Post and references relevant reports.